Chechnya in Brief (From 1990 to March of 1997)

Timeline of significant events related to Chechnya
Compiled by Nurdane Oksas

Part 3

MAY 1996

96/05/03: An article in the Jamestown Foundation's Prism noted that Dudaev's assassination had struck the final blow to Yeltsin's March 31 peace plan for Chechnya. As the article suggested, even before Dudaev's death the announcement of a troop withdrawal had not been taken seriously, the cease-fire and mediated talks had not materialized, and a true discussion of the political status for Chechnya had not occurred. Moreover, the article reported that military operations against civilian targets in Chechnya had escalated, that plans for basing troops permanently in Chechnya had been publicized and that a Russian General, Nikolai Koshman, had been appointed Prime Minister of Chechnya unilaterally by Moscow (without consulting Zavgaev) --while, at the same time, Chechen fighters continued to move unimpeded in the republic. The article also discussed the fact that Western pressure from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the UN Human Rights Commission, senior European officials and Medecins Sans Frontiers, had had no impact on Russia's actions.

96/05/03: In another article in Prism on May 3, Segodnya reporter, Maria Eismont described Dudaev's importance for the Chechen cause: Dudaev was the embodiment of Chechnya's legitimacy: Chechen fighters had a President, a Constitution, a Chief of Staff, and unit commanders appointed by the President to look to; as such they had become the Chechen Army rather than a group of bandits. Also, Dudaev had been the "binding force" keeping all of the field commanders together, holding regular meetings every two months and giving the semblance of being in control of all activity. He was, in addition, the symbol of Russia's "helplessness in resolving the Chechen problem."

96/05/03: At the end of a two day Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg, Russian Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov defended Russia's policy in Chechnya. He asserted that Russia was prepared to hold talks with Chechen rebels, even about Chechnya's status, but stressed that independence was not a possibility. In answering criticism of Russian brutality in the campaign, he reasserted the position of many Russian leaders that a large-scale military campaign was a direct response to a high-level of terrorism that Europe did not have to face.

96/05/04: In Moscow, the Russian authorities arrested Beslan Gantimerov, the former Mayor of Grozny and now a Deputy Prime Minister in Zavgaev's government. Gantimerov was accused of corruption (embezzling several billions of rubles intended for the reconstruction of Grozny) and detained in Lefortovo prison. Prior to his arrest, Gantimerov had strongly criticized the Russian operation in Chechnya and the treatment of Chechen civilians by Russian troops. In response to Gantimerov's arrest, Zavgaev appealed to Moscow, noting that the arrest now undermined his government's position in the republic. However, as Segodnya suggested on May 5, the arrest could also have been motivated by the fact that Gantimerov had publicly announced on April 18 that he was now in opposition to the pro-Moscow Zavgaev government, and planned to go off on his own with the backing of his several hundred-strong paramilitary group. The article noted that Gantimerov posed a real threat to Zavgaev's position, and suggested that Zavgaev's protest to Moscow was disingenuous, and that he was, in fact, complicit in Gantimerov's arrest.

96/05/04: Moscow radio reported that President Yeltsin was planning a May 16 visit to Chechnya to conduct trilateral talks between the Russian leadership, the pro-Dudaev Chechens and Zavgaev's government. Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, the new Chechen President, responded to this news on May 5 by warning that he could not guarantee Yeltsin's safety during such a trip, and that Zavgaev's government should participate in the talks as part of the Russian delegation rather than as a third party. Yandarbiev also demanded an official denial from the Russian government that it played any role in Dudaev's death.

96/05/05: Over the weekend of May 4-5, Chechen fighters were reported to have stepped up their action against the Russian forces in the republic. They attacked the Russian Interior Ministry headquarters in Grozny, killing 3 soldiers. In addition, they broke into radio frequencies to spread "propaganda;" shot down a Sukhoi-25 ground assault plane in southeastern Chechnya, killing the two pilots; ambushed a Russian column in eastern Chechnya; and kidnapped 11 members of the Moscow-backed Chechen government's police force.

96/05/06: According to the Moscow press, Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov proposed that the Special Observation Commission, first created by the July 30, 1995 Military Accord between Russia and Chechnya, be reinstated in the Shali district of the republic as an experiment. The idea would be to test the Commission as an effective mechanism for bringing combat operations to an end. The Commission could work to prevent a military show-down in the region, which had been under siege by Russian federal troops for several weeks. Maskhadov also stated that he was ready for military talks with the Russian high command but not for political negotiations (ITAR-TASS, 5/6/96). Maskhadov noted that he would discuss exchanges of prisoners, security guarantees for Russian troops and the establishment of cease-fire zones. Vladimir Zorin, the Chairman of the Duma's Committee for Nationality Affairs and the Deputy Head of the Russian delegation to the 1995 Russian-Chechen peace talks, endorsed the view that the July 30 Military Accord should be used as the basis for a new round of talks between Russia and Chechnya.

96/05/11: Russian Interior Minister, Anatoly Kulikov, told Interfax on May 8 that President Yeltsin's planned visit to Chechnya was impossible from the security point of view. In spite of Kulikov's assertion, in campaign speeches on May 10-11, President Yeltsin announced again that he planned to visit Chechnya before the Presidential elections to hold tripartite talks with the Russian government, the pro-Moscow Chechen government and the pro-Dudaev forces. Simultaneous with Yeltsin's statements, fighting continued on the ground in Chechnya, with 8 Russian soldiers killed in clashes over the weekend and Russian attacks on civilian targets and Dudaev strongholds.

96/05/14: The head of the OSCE's mission in Grozny, Tim Guldiman, held talks in Moscow with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. He was then scheduled to return to Chechnya for meetings with pro-Dudaev Chechen leaders and to brief Chernomyrdin on the outcome. These meetings seemed to mark the beginning of a new phase of shuttle diplomacy in the peace process, spearheaded by the OSCE.

96/05/14: The pro-Moscow Chechen parliament scheduled new legislative elections for the republic on June 16, parallel with the Russian Presidential Elections.

96/05/17: On May 17, Russian Public TV reported that the Duma had adopted in principle an amnesty for both Russian and Chechen fighters in the Chechen war with the exception of those who perpetrated hostage-taking or terrorist acts.

96/05/18: On May 18, NTV reported that Chechen opposition leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and OSCE Grozny mission chairman Tim Guldiman had discussed the possibility of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev acting as a mediator between the Russian government and the separatist Chechen leadership.

96/05/18: A session of the Chechen Internal Affairs Ministry was held to consider the question of ensuring the security of Yeltsin's proposed visit to Chechnya. Pro-Dudaev Chechen leaders also displayed considerable interest in the possibility of talks with Russian leaders who were not implicated in the killing of Dzhokhar Dudaev. The President of Bashkiria, Murtaza Rakhimov, suggested in the Russian press that President Yeltsin might revise his peace plan based on a visit to Chechnya, by taking into account the actual state of affairs there (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5/18/96).

96/05/20: On May 20, Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, the commander of the Russian federal forces in Chechnya, asserted that the Chechen resistance would be eliminated by early to mid-June, prior to the Russian presidential elections. Two days later, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said that Russian troops would be withdrawn from Chechnya between June 1 and August 1. A high ranking military officer also told ITAR-TASS that there were now more than 41,000 federal troops in the republic, including 19,000 which belonged to the Defense Ministry. Grachev noted that after the pullout, only units of the North Caucasus military district would remain in Chechnya. Meanwhile, Russian actions against both military and civilian targets continued in Grozny and elsewhere in Chechnya.

96/05/22: Russian forces invaded and captured the Chechen stronghold of Bamut. The village had been the site of heavy fighting between Russian and Chechen troops over the past year. Nikolai Koshman, Prime Minister of the Moscow-backed Chechen government, claimed that Bamut was the "rebel's last stronghold," OMRI reported.

96/05/23: On May 23, the Jamestown Foundation's Monitor reported that the Russian command for the North Caucasus had acknowledged on May 22 that 40 Russian soldiers had been killed and 48 wounded in a counterattack staged by Chechen fighters defending the stronghold of Bamut. In Moscow, the Defense Ministry offered conflicting figures along with and unsupported counterclaim that Russian forces had killed more than 100 Chechen fighters in the same battle. At the same time Chechen leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiev announced that his leadership council had proposed negotiations with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan. The proposal linked the negotiations to a "real end to combat operations" and a commitment to withdraw Russian troops from Chechnya.

96/05/24: Boris Yeltsin announced that he was ready to receive Acting Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev for talks in Moscow. The Russian press reported that the talks were intended to relaunch the negotiations on military issues suspended in October 1995, but would not include a discussion of Chechnya's political status. In an article in Segodnya, Russian commentator Pavel Felgengauer declared that there had been intensive informal contacts between the Russian authorities and the inner circle of new Chechen leaders, Yandarbiev and Aslan Maskhadov. Felgengauer asserted that the storming of Bamut by Russian troops had not in fact been a senseless act, as the weakening of the more radical forces concentrated around Bamut might actually strengthen the moderate wing of pro-Dudaev Chechens.

96/05/24: Izvestiya reported that to date, Russian Defense Ministry casualties in the Chechen war included 1947 people killed, 5693 wounded, and 376 missing. Among the Russian Interior Ministry troops, 678 were killed and 3175 were wounded.

96/05/27: A Chechen delegation comprising Acting President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, the co-Chairman of the suspended Special Observation Commission Khozhakhmed Yarikhanov, southwestern front commander Akhmed Zakaev, Vice President Said-Hasan Abumuslimov, and Information Minister Movladi Udugov flew to Moscow for talks with Boris Yeltsin. After the talks, an agreement was signed by the Chechen delegates and by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Security Council Chairman Oleg Lobov, Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov, Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov, and pro-Moscow Chechen leader Doku Zavgaev--as a member of Russian delegation. The document called for the cessation of hostilities as of 00:00 hours on June 1 and an exchange of prisoners within two weeks. Future relations between Russia and Chechnya were deferred to further talks by mutual agreement. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, whose imminent dismissal had been rumored for several weeks, was absent at the signing of this Russian-Chechen preliminary agreement. Prior to the May 27 talks he denied that the military high command was displeased with Yeltsin's decision to pursue peace negotiations with Chechen separatists, saying that "the leadership of the defense ministry...cannot have a position different from the supreme Commander-in-Chief."

96/05/28: On May 28 Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, accompanied by Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov; Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov; Emil Pain, member of the State Commission for Chechen Settlement; Sergei Stepashin, Executive Secretary of the State Commission for Chechen Settlement; Yuri Baturin, the President's National Security Aide; Sergei Shakhrai, Chairman of the Commission on Separation of Powers between the Subjects of Federation; and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. On the evening of the same day Yeltsin left Chechnya. The Chechen delegation stayed in Moscow during the Russian President's visit to their republic. During his meeting with local residents, Yeltsin said that extreme measures had been used in Chechnya because "a coup had taken place here and power had been seized by the separatists." While not denying the success of the talks with the Chechen delegation, the President also said that "the criminal regime which seized Chechnya should be eliminated in the name of the protection of the population of the republic, restoration of the law and peace on its territory, order in the North Caucasus, and preservation of the unity of Russia." Addressing the Russian troops, President Yeltsin asserted: "You've won. We have gained a victory over the rebellious Dudaev's regime." During his visit, Yeltsin also noted that an important condition of a political settlement in Chechnya would be new legislative elections on June 16.

96/05/28: Rossiiskaya Gazeta reported on May 31, that President Yeltsin had decreed on May 28 that a public discussion should begin in Chechnya in June on a power-sharing treaty with Russia. The draft treaty would recognize Chechnya's right to self-determination and guarantee its special status within the Russian Federation --but without giving the republic any special powers. According to the draft treaty, foreign relations and economic responsibilities would be shared by the Chechen and federal governments. Chechnya, however, would have jurisdiction over the domestic political affairs and would have the right to conclude international treaties. A new version of the treaty, based on Chechen responses would be submitted to Yeltsin by the end of the month.

96/05/29: The reaction to Yeltsin's meeting with Yandarbiev by a substantial part of Russian political establishment was on the one hand hopeful, and on the other -- guarded and distrustful. State Duma deputy General Eduard Vorobev, who had resigned from the military after refusing to lead the federal armed forces in Chechnya, was afraid of "cunning" on the part of the Chechens. Communist Party leader Alexander Shabanov, speaking to Nezavisimaya Gazeta on May 29, described the meeting as a propaganda-populist stunt by Yeltsin. Among the Chechens, Salambek Maigov, co-chairman of the Coordinating Council of Chechnya's Socio-Political Organizations, said that there was "too much euphoria" around the accords and that it was too early to reach any conclusions. According to Maigov, the proposed June 1 cease-fire could not take place unless political issues, such as the legality of the Chechen resistance movement, were addressed simultaneously. Nevertheless, Maigov was convinced that Boris Yeltsin had achieved his main strategic objective: he presented the cease-fire agreement to the Russian public as an end to the war.

96/05/31: According to the preliminary agreement, the cease-fire should have taken effect at midnight on May 31, but the Chechen forces were reported to have attacked Russian troops. Deaths were claimed on both sides. Russian TV and ITAR-TASS reported that the disarmament talks scheduled for June 1 had now been postponed and would be held in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia, on June 4-5.

JUNE 1996

96/06/03: The Presidents of Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, along with pro-Moscow Chechen leader Doku Zavgaev and other North Caucasian presidents, met in Kislovodsk for a summit on the Caucasus. OMRI reported that at the conference, the presidents signed a declaration supporting territorial integrity and the rights of ethnic minorities, and condemning terrorism, aggressive separatism, and religious extremism.

96/06/05: At a press conference before the proposed June 5 round of negotiations, Said-Hasan Abumuslimov, the Vice President of Chechnya, stated that the Chechen side had prepared a protocol proposing to withdraw all the federal troops by June 15--before the disarmament of the Chechen forces--and to postpone the elections to a new Peoples Assembly (Parliament) until a peaceful settlement was reached. The head of the pro-Moscow Chechen government, Doku Zavgaev, strongly opposed the postponement of the elections. According to Reuters, Abumuslimov admitted that the Chechen camp was split between those who wanted to continue talks with President Yeltsin and a faction that preferred to await the outcome of the Russian presidential election. On June 6, the Russian-Chechen talks were adjourned for three days without signing a written agreement.

96/06/06: NTV reported on June 6 that during a campaign trip to Tver, Russian President Boris Yeltsin asserted, "there is no war in Chechnya, it's only a battle with crime" and that all that remained of the Chechen resistance to Moscow were small bands of "three, five or ten people."

96/06/10: The talks between the Russian federal authorities and the pro-Dudaev Chechen forces under Yandarbiev resumed in Nazran on June 9. Russian Minister for Nationalities and Federal Relations Vyacheslav Mikhailov issued a protest to the Chechen delegation in response to the continuing attacks and terrorist acts against federal troops. Both sides reaffirmed their adherence to the understandings reached in Moscow on May 27 on a cease-fire and the exchange of prisoners. In the course of the negotiations, the Russian and Chechen delegations reached an agreement to postpone the elections to a new People's Assembly until after the withdrawal of federal troops. With this obstacle removed, Vyacheslav Mikhailov and Aslan Maskhadov signed two separate protocols on June 10, one on the withdrawal of Russian troops by late August and the disarmament of the Chechen fighters, and the second on the release of all hostages and prisoners of war.

96/06/10: During a campaign trip to Novosibirsk, Boris Yeltsin said that although the war was over, the Chechen peace process must be approached carefully, as "we can't surrender to a bunch of bandits, either." Meanwhile, formations of the 245th Infantry Brigade began to leave their positions in the Chechen region of Shatoi. Roman Sokolovsky, chief spokesman for the federal force in Chechnya, stated that the federal command was planning to complete the withdrawal process by August 31. Only two federal brigades, he reported, would remain in Chechnya on a permanent basis: the 205th Infantry Brigade and the 101st brigade of Interior Ministry troops.

96/06/11: According to a statement made on June 11 by representatives of the Moscow-backed Chechen government, in spite of the agreement in Nazran the Chechen parliamentary elections were still scheduled to take place June 16 as planned. Acting Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev vowed to employ "any means" necessary to disrupt the elections to a new Chechen People's Assembly, and Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov threatened an "incredible" response if the elections were not, in fact, postponed. President Yeltsin remained aloof from the dispute, announcing in St. Petersburg that the question of the election was the local matter.

96/06/14: On June 14, the last official day for campaigning in the mass media for the Russian Presidential elections, Russian Public TV broadcast a lengthy interview with Boris Yeltsin. In this interview, the President emphasized that he had never declared a war "against the Chechen people" and personally felt "pain for every mother and every family who lost someone." He argued, however, that the military campaign was absolutely necessary to prevent the disintegration of Russia and that the Russian Constitution "gives the right to put down a riot by force."

96/06/16: Russian presidential elections and elections for a new Chechen People's Assembly began simultaneously in Chechnya on June 16. The Chechen opposition refrained from carrying out its threats to disrupt the voting. ITAR-TASS reported the final turnout in Chechnya as 58.9%. There was no voting in the Vedeno region, which was controlled by the pro-Dudaev opposition. In its official June 18 statement, the OSCE described the voting as "unfree and unfair" and "incompatible with OSCE principles," according to the Jamestown Foundation's Monitor on June 19.

96/06/18: Alexander Lebed won third place in the first round of the Russian Presidential elections. Subsequently, Boris Yeltsin met with him twice in two days, and hoping to win over Lebed's supporters in the second election round, appointed him Security Council Secretary and National Security Aide on June 18. Lebed replaced Oleg Lobov and Yuri Baturin in these security positions. In an interview with NTV, Alexander Lebed said that he would personally take charge of the Chechen peace negotiations. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin invited Lebed to join the State Commission for the Settlement of the Chechen Conflict. According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta on June 22, Sergei Slipchenko, the head of the press service of the State Commission for the Settlement of the Chechen Conflict, stated that Lebed's appointment would enhance political realism, and that very soon there would be a swing toward actual stabilization in Chechnya.

96/06/20: Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov on June 20 ordered his forces to refrain from further hostilities until after the second round of the presidential elections, but sporadic fighting continued in Chechnya. Another Russian-Chechen negotiating session was held on June 22, but the sides were unable to define either the notions of "special operations," or "demilitarization," or other points contained in the June 10 Nazran agreements. On June 24, Monitor reported that since the ceasefire went into effect on June 1, the Russian side had lost 38 soldiers with some 130 wounded; while on the Chechen side - 25 had been killed and 72 wounded in sporadic exchanges of fire and mine explosions. According to Interfax, on June 25, Russian and Chechen delegations exchanged initial lists of prisoners to be released. These lists, comprised of 1,089 names submitted by the Russian side and 1,322 names on the Chechen side, covered POWs, MIAs, filtration camp detainees and hostages.

96/06/28: NTV reported on June 26, that Russian Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov, and the Secretary of the Russian State Commission for the Settlement of the Chechen Conflict, Sergei Stepashin, had flown to Grozny and then to the Vedeno district to discuss the future of the peace talks with the village elders. On June 27 in Khankala, two working groups responsible for implementing the June 10 peace agreements exchanged lists of prisoners. On June 28, Vyacheslav Mikhailov met with the Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov in the village of Novie Atagi to discuss the failure to implement the peace agreements signed on June 10.

96/06/28: On June 28, under the order of Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of the joint force in Chechnya, the 245th Motorized Infantry Regiment began its withdrawal. Defense Ministry force commander Vladimir Shamanov announced to Nezavisimaya Gazeta that the withdrawal of federal forces from Chechnya would proceed depending on the stabilization of the situation in the republic and on the "actual disarmament of illegal armed formations."

JULY 1996

96/07/07: On July 7, Russian forces renewed their artillery bombardment of villages in south-east Chechnya amid mutual accusations of non-compliance with the peace agreements of May 27 and June 10 (OMRI 7/8/96). A spokesman for Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov said that the Russians had failed to remove roadblocks outside Chechen towns and villages and to close filtration camps by the Nazran agreement's deadline of July 7. The Russians, for their part, accused the Chechens of continuing attacks on Russian forces. On July 8, Vyacheslav Tikhomirov presented an ultimatum to Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, demanding the release of all prisoners by 6:00 PM on July 9, or else he would undertake "adequate measures against the bandits and begin their elimination" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7/10/96).

96/07/09: The Chechen villages of Gekhi and Makhkety, near Grozny, were attacked by Russian troops on July 9 in response to the rebels' failure to respond to Tikhomirov's ultimatum. The OSCE in Grozny issued a statement warning that fighting could spread. Alexander Lebed was reported in the Washington Post to blame the rebels for the latest surge in fighting. According to Alexei Arbatov, the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Parliament's Defense Committee, Yeltsin's statements about seeking peace in Chechnya had now begun to "look like an election farce." (Washington Post, 7/12/96).

96/07/14: The Financial Times and the New York Times both reported that the new Security Council Secretary, Alexander Lebed, once known as an advocate of self-determination for Chechnya, had now endorsed the offensive and defended the actions of Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, Russia's troop commander in Chechnya. Lebed was reported to have also spoken of Doku Zavgaev, the Moscow-backed Chechen leader, as the "legitimate, freely-elected choice of the will of the Chechen people."

96/07/16: The New York Times reported that to date, it was estimated that 30,000 people, most of them civilians, had been killed in the Chechen conflict.

96/07/17: On July 17, President Boris Yeltsin appointed Col. Gen. Igor Rodionov to replace Pavel Grachev as Defense Minister. According to the Washington Post (7/19/96), Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who had been relatively conciliatory on the war, had told US Vice President Albert Gore that Russia would begin pulling out troops from Chechnya. However, hard-line Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov was reported to be opposed to a troop withdrawal, asserting, "today is premature to consider any withdrawal of the federal forces from the region."

96/07/19: Citing Chechen press spokesman Movladi Udugov, OMRI reported that a group of field commanders had recently discussed possible options for strikes against Russian troops. The field commanders had decided to refrain from further full-scale military operations, although they reserved the right to respond to "provocations." However, Sergei Slipchenko, spokesman for the Commission for the Settlement of the Chechen Conflict, argued that there were discrepancies between Movladi Udugov's claim that the various field commanders' were all subordinate to Yandarbiev and a statement by renegade commander Salman Raduev (the leader of the January 1996 raid on Kizlyar), that he rejected the Nazran peace agreement and would continue combat operations. Slipchenko asserted that these discrepancies demonstrated serious rifts within the Chechen leadership.

96/07/19: On July 19 Russia's lower house of Parliament, the State Duma, urged President Yeltsin to halt the fighting in Chechnya and restart the peace talks. The resolution, approved by a vote of 272-4, stated: "We call on you to stop all military actions, renew negotiations and reveal their contents to the whole population of the Russian Federation."

96/07/27: On July 27, Chechen representative Kazbek Makhashev and Russian Colonel Alexander Pilipenko met to discuss the exchange of prisoners. The two sides agreed on necessary steps for further exchanges. Prior to this meeting, some 200 people held a demonstration in Grozny to demand the resignation of the Moscow-backed Chechen government and the withdrawal of Russian troops.

UGUST 1996

96/08/03: On August 3, Russian Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov and the Secretary of the Russian State Commission for the Settlement of the Chechen Conflict, Sergei Stepashin, announced in Grozny that they were ready for the direct talks with Chechen rebels (OMRI, 8/5/96). Chechen spokesman Movladi Udugov, however, said that no talks would be possible as long as Russian forces continued military operations against Chechens.

96/08/6: On August 6, on the eve of Yeltsin's inauguration as the newly-elected President of Russia, Chechen militants attacked Grozny. It was not clear how many militants had participated in the attack, but various estimations ranged from 200 to 600 men. At the same time, attacks were launched against two neighboring cities, Argun and Gudermes. According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta (8/7/96), the State Commission for the Settlement of the Chechen Conflict demanded that Zelimkhan Yandarbiev condemn the actions of the field commander in charge of the operation, Ruslan Gilaev. Aslan Maskhadov told Ekho Moskvy radio that the assault was ordered by Yandarbiev to force Moscow back to the negotiating table and to show "Russia and the world community...that the war is not over."

96/08/07: In a television interview on August 7, Alexander Lebed, Security Council Secretary asserted: "This war is beneficial for too many people. The roots of the war are economic. We have to create a way to bring the two sides to the bargaining table. It is a torturous path but it is the only way." According to the New York Times on August 8, the Chechen forces had virtually no hope of defeating the Russian forces and it was likely that they would withdraw from Grozny after inflicting as much damage as possible on Russian military, following a pattern established by their March raid on the capital..

96/08/08: The upper house of the Russian Parliament, the Federation Council, decided on August 8 to set up its own commission to seek a peaceful settlement of the Chechen crisis. Valery Kokov, the president of North Caucasus republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, was named to head the commission (OMRI, 8/9/96). The newly reappointed Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, simultaneously demanded an investigation into why Russian troops had been unable to prevent the Chechens' attack on Grozny, which, up until this point had been under federal forces' control for more than a year.

96/08/09: On August 9, the siege of Grozny intensified when Chechens surrounded 7,000 Russian troops and began bombarding them with grenades and mortars. This action forced Russian officials to evacuate civilians from their main military bases at the Severny and Khankala airports. A Russian military spokesman was quoted as saying that "the situation is totally out of the control of the federal command." According to the New York Times, the rebels would have lacked the supply lines and the fire-power to hold Grozny, but nevertheless, the Chechen attack on Grozny served as an admonition to President Yeltsin, who had bragged during his six hour-long campaign trip to the region in May that Russia had won the war.

96/08/10: On August 10, Alexander Lebed replaced Oleg Lobov as the Presidential Envoy to Chechnya. On August 12, he returned from a secret trip to Chechnya. He reported immediately to Boris Yeltsin on his talks with Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov in Novie Atagi, which included a discussion of the terms for a bilateral cease-fire and the pullout of the separatist forces from Grozny. The Russian President reportedly approved his proposals for a settlement of the conflict. Although no details of the peace plan were released, Chechen spokesman Movladi Udugov stated that it contained a "principally new" approach to settling the conflict. Lebed also expressed outrage at the condition of Russian troops in Chechnya, describing them as "lice-ridden, hungry and underclothed." He said that they had been sent to Chechnya as "cannon fodder," and should be recalled from combat for "purely humanitarian considerations."

96/08/13: By mid-August, the Chechens seemed emboldened by their easy capture of the capital and several other Chechen cities. On August 13 the acting commander of Russian troops in Chechnya, General Konstantin Pulikovsky, and the Chechen chief of staff Aslan Maskhadov met in Novie Atagi. Media reports stated that the two sides had agreed on a truce to evacuate hundreds of wounded civilians from Grozny. However, General Pulikovsky denied that a formal cease-fire agreement had been negotiated with the Chechens, and stated that the two sides had agreed merely to limit combat operations while civilians were evacuated and the exchange of dead and wounded took place.

96/08/14: The truce was scheduled to go into effect on August 14 at noon. Fifteen minutes later two Russian planes fired at a caravan of refugees trying to flee Grozny. No one died in the attack, but several people were wounded. Against this backdrop, President Yeltsin signed a decree on August 14, giving Alexander Lebed broad powers and full responsibility for overseeing the Chechen crisis. The State Commission for the Settlement of the Chechen Conflict, headed by the Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, was dissolved by the same decree.

96/08/16: Alexander Lebed, President Yeltsin's National Security Adviser and Security Council Secretary, demanded the dismissal of the Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov, whom he blamed for Moscow's humiliating retreat in Grozny before the Chechen attack. Lebed accused Kulikov of ignoring advance information about a rebel offensive on Grozny and of conspiracy to spread the war into neighboring Caucasus republics. In response to Lebed's allegations Kulikov threatened to resign.

96/08/18: Negotiations between senior Russian and Chechen commanders continued on August 18, concentrating on the creation of a truce-monitoring commission that had been agreed on earlier during the preliminary talks between Alexander Lebed and Chechen leaders. Simultaneous with the negotiations, Russian helicopters began dropping leaflets warning all remaining civilians in Grozny-- by some estimates 200,000 people --to leave the city within 48 hours, after which time Russian troops reserved the right to relaunch air strikes. General Pulikovsky told reporters that he was ordering the assault because the Chechen rebels had violated the terms of the ceasefire negotiated the previous week (although he had denied that this was a formal agreement on August 13). Around Grozny the fighting intensified. According to Interfax, Pulikovsky insisted that "the only way out of the current situation in Grozny [was] the use of force." General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, who had returned from holiday to resume command of the Russian forces in Chechnya, also said that he would attack Chechen positions. However, the new Russian Defense Minister, Igor Rodionov, voiced disagreement with Pulikovsky's actions on Russian TV.

96/08/19: On August 19, Yeltsin called on Alexander Lebed to submit a plan for the settlement of the Chechen crisis, along with a report of who was at fault for the failures of the last two weeks, by no later that August 26.

96/08/21: Several hours before the expiration of the Russian ultimatum to the Chechens, US President Bill Clinton sent a letter to Boris Yeltsin with an appeal to reopen the negotiations. Ministries of other countries, including Great Britain, Germany, Canada, Italy, and Turkey, and the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference Organization, also expressed their concern about the situation in Chechnya, and asked Russian authorities to cancel the proposed military assault on Grozny, urging them to find the way out of the crisis at the negotiating table.

96/08/22: Security Council Secretary Alexander Lebed arrived in Grozny on August 21, met with Tikhomirov and then went to Novie Atagi to meet with Chechen leaders. Lebed called Pulikovsky's ultimatum a "bad joke" and stated that there would be no assault on Grozny. On August 22, the Russian Security chief signed a detailed peace agreement with Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen Chief of Staff. The agreement, "On Urgent Measures to Stop Fire and Combat Operations in the City of Grozny and on the Territory of Chechnya," included provisions for a ceasefire as of noon on August 23; an exchange of prisoners, refugees, and the dead; and the withdrawal of troops to specified areas.

96/08/27: Subsequent to the agreement with Lebed, the Commander of the federal troops, Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, and Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov signed a Protocol about the realization of the first stage of the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, during press conference in Moscow, the Moscow-backed Chechen head of state, Doku Zavgaev, accused Lebed of staging a second coup d'tat in Chechnya (the first being Dudaev's overthrow of Zavgaev's government in 1991).

96/08/28: On August 28, 1996, the negotiations between Alexander Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov were put on hold in response to President Yeltsin's silence on the agreements. Izvestiya speculated that this silence was due to the fact that the balance of forces in the Kremlin battle over Chechnya had not yet been determined, and that the main objective of this battle was not peace in Chechnya, but the political elimination of Lebed. Meanwhile, Gennady Seleznev, the speaker of the State Duma appealed to the President, Prime-minister and to Lebed personally to prevent the Chechen forces from celebrating their seeming victory over Russia on September 6--the fifth anniversary of the proclaimed independence of Chechnya.

96/08/29: Lebed headed back to Chechnya after a telephone conversation with Yeltsin which he refused to comment on publicly. According to Izvestiya, an agreement between the Kremlin and the Chechen forces had already been signed by the Justice Minister and the Prime-Minister.

96/08/31: In the villages of Khasavyurt, in Dagestan, Alexander Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov signed a peace agreement: the "Statement and Principles for Determining the Fundamentals of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic." In these accords, the two sides agreed to postpone a decision on the status of the Chechen republic and to resolve the issue sometime before December 31, 2001. In addition, they agreed to establish a joint commission of Russian and Chechen officials by October 1, 1996, which would monitor the troop pull-out, prepare crime-fighting measures, prepare proposals for financial and budgetary relations, and make arrangements for the economic reconstruction of the republic. The accords were published in Izvestiya on September 3.

SEPTEMBER 1996

96/09/05: Approximately 200 people gathered in Moscow in support of Lebed's peace initiatives in Chechnya. Representatives and supporters of the Democratic Union, led by Valeria Novodvorskaya, the Committee of Soldier's Mothers, and the Democratic Russia movement attended. Demonstrators coined slogans such as: "Those against Lebed are pro-war," "An agreement giving Chechnya independence is the way to peace," and "President, support Lebed."

96/09/06: The Russian Federation Council commission on Chechnya was established at a closed session of the Russian parliament's upper house. Its first move was to draft a letter to the President and government, inquiring why the Chechen crisis was being resolved "in an unconstitutional way." Members of the commission expressed concern that "the legitimately elected Chechen leader Doku Zavgaev" had been left out of the Chechen settlement (Interfax, 9/7/96). The commission included Lebed adversaries such as Doku Zavgaev himself and the Mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov.

96/09/07: The Deputy Prime Minister of the Moscow-backed government of Chechnya, Kharon Amirkhanov, announced his resignation, along with First Deputy Prime Minister Abdulla Bugaev and Deputy Prime Minister Vakha Zagaev. According to Moskovskiye Novosti (9/1-8/96), nearly all the ministers of the Zavgaev government had announced their intention to leave their posts, stating that they did not want to interfere with the peace process. However, it was not clear that pro-Moscow Chechen head of state Doku Zavgaev and Prime Minister Nikolai Koshman would leave the Chechen political scene equally voluntarily.

96/09/07: Segodnya published an interview with Chechen leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiev. He noted that Chechnya was "interested in restoring the closest economic and political ties" with Russia and a "key to bilateral relations is the attainment of guarantees that what has happened up to date will never recur." "These guarantees must not depend on the situation in Russia, and for this reason such relations are being established within the framework of international law rather than the framework of Russia," he stressed. Yandarbiev declared: "We still trust Lebed; we still adhere to the agreements that have been reached, and expect a proper attitude from the Russian side.... Although we are more optimistic than ever, the danger remains first of all from the Russian top leadership. It is reassuring that Boris Yeltsin has positively assessed Alexander Lebed's efforts and the peace process in general." Speaking about the elections in Chechnya, Yandarbiev suggested that the Chechen side was ready to hold them if "Russia withdraws its troops and no longer threatens to interfere in our affairs. In this case we pledge to hold elections within two to three months, coordinate this issue with Russia and take its interests into account."

96/09/08: The New York Times reported that, according to an official announcement by Security Council Secretary Alexander Lebed, 80,000 people had been killed in the Chechen war. Lebed asserted that most of those killed were civilians caught in Russian bombings, while more than 10,000 were Russian soldiers. He suggested that many times this number of soldiers had been wounded. Human rights groups in the region also noted that more than 1,000 Russian soldiers had been taken prisoner, about 700 were missing and thousands had deserted.

96/09/09: Lebed met with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to discuss the results of a Russian legal examination of the documents signed in Khasavyurt, and the overall situation in Chechnya. The examination was conducted by the Ministry of Justice and by a group of independent experts, headed by the Vice President of the Russian Association of International Law Oleg Khlystov.

96/09/09: In accordance with the Khasavyurt accords, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev signed orders under which three ministers from the Moscow-backed Chechen government (in charge of housing, road construction, and the power industry), were included in the coalition government. Pro-Moscow Chechen leader Doku Zavgaev, on the other hand, told Interfax that not a single member of the current Chechen leadership would join the coalition government. Representatives of the Chechen Coordinating Council of Political Parties and Movements were expected to be given 14 seats in Yandarbiev's coalition government, including the position of Prime Minister, five ministers, four first deputy ministers and four deputy ministers. The Coordinating Council, co-chaired by Vice President Said-Hasan Abumuslimov, united about 20 Chechen political parties and movements. Representatives of Chechen communities from Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also belonged to the Council (Interfax, 9/9/96, 9/10/96). The leaders of the Coordinating Council stated that it would be difficult to set up a moderate coalition government since almost all politicians in Chechnya supported Chechen independence (OMRI, 9/9/96).

96/09/10: A congress of Chechen political public and religious representatives groups took place on the 10th of September. The congress gave its support to the end of the war and welcomed the settlement plan drawn up by Alexander Lebed and approved by Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin, according to a statement by the Russian Security Council's press service. The congress also supported the formation of a coalition government and favored conditions for free elections in Chechnya (Interfax, 9/11/96). Lebed offered this opinion about the congress: "We hoped the congress would gather three sides: supporters of Doku Zavgaev and Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, and the Chechens living outside Chechnya. However, the congress got drowned in emotions, and it's impossible to take any reasonable decision when emotions run too high" (Interfax, 9/12/96).

96/09/10: On September 10 the New York Times published a letter from Michael Lucas, Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute of the New School for Social Research, in which the author claimed, that according to official auditors of the Russian Federation, the Defense Ministry in 1995 alone spent 5.71 trillion rubles, or $1.2 billion, on maintaining its armed forces in Chechnya. This figure did not include expenses of other defense- related ministries and agencies. Mr. Lucas stipulated, that a conservative estimate of the cost for 1996 was likely to be $2 billion. He also noted, that as of January 1996, the Defense Ministry's unpaid wages to military and civilian personnel amounted to 4.3 trillion rubles, or $930 million.

96/09/11: Commenting on the results of the legal examination of the Khasavyurt accords signed by Security Council Secretary Alexander Lebed and Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov, Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev told Interfax that the accords were "a political declaration" and had no separate legal significance. However, according to Kovalev, the agreement offered a basis for concluding two legal documents: a treaty on the general principles of defining the status of Chechnya and a power sharing agreement between Moscow and Grozny. The Minister stressed the two key priorities of Russian policy: to restore peace in Chechnya and to guarantee the unity and territorial integrity of the country. Boris Yeltsin instructed Alexander Lebed to continue his work to settle the conflict, taking into consideration the conclusions made by the Russian Justice Ministry.

96/09/11: Ruslan Martagov, the Moscow-backed Chechen government's press-secretary, told Interfax on September 11 that the supporters of Doku Zavgaev did not rule out an armed struggle by pro-independence Chechens against the Chechen opposition. Zavgaev claimed that separatist Chechen forces were interning those who fought against them in concentration camps, while Russian Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov warned of civil war in Chechnya (OMRI, 9/12/96). Martagov noted that there were about 4,000 armed supporters of the Moscow-backed Chechen government, mostly based in the Urus-Martan, Nadterechny and Grozny districts.

96/09/12: The Presidium of the Coordinating Council of the Popular-Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR), chaired by Gennady Zyuganov, published a statement on 12 September, reported Interfax. Reading the statement at a news conference, Zyuganov, along with Duma Deputy Alexei Podberezkin, declared, "What has happened in Chechnya is the start of Russia's territorial disintegration." Blaming the President, State Duma, and Federation Council, the statement read: "Russia has been betrayed and sold out... The army and the soldiers have been betrayed...What did so many people die for?"

96/09/13: Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, the commander of the joint Russian federal forces in Chechnya, suspended the pullout of Russian troops from Chechnya, according to Interfax on September 13. "Federal units will not leave Chechnya until the package of issues concerning the exchange of prisoners of war and hostages is resolved," he stated. He also noted that his position fully matched that of Alexander Lebed. However, Lebed told journalists in Moscow, that General Tikhomirov was "a little hot-headed" when he announced a pause in the troop withdrawal. "We'll sort the matter out," he pledged. Subsequently, on September 17, Lebed gave a press conference in Novie Atagi, in which he asserted that Russian troop withdrawal from Chechnya and the demilitarization of the Chechen capital of Grozny would be continued.

96/09/14: Viktor Chernomyrdin opened a conference on Chechnya in Moscow. He stressed that a settlement in Chechnya could only rest on the Constitution and territorial integrity of Russia. Alexander Lebed reported on the actions taken to settle the Chechen conflict. Participants in the conference discussed the formation of government structures in Chechnya during the transition period, and the military and legal aspects of the settlement, along with pressing social problems such as a guarantee of citizens' personal safety, securing the release of detainees, and curbing crime. Attending the conference were Presidential Administration Chief Anatoly Chubais, Minister for Nationalities Affairs and Federal Relations Vyacheslav Mikhailov, Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev, Federal Security Service Director Nikolai Kovalev, Army Chief of Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov, Chief of the Government's Administrative Department Sergei Stepashin, and Chairman of the Duma Committee for International Affairs Vladimir Lukin (Interfax, 9/14/96).

96/09/18: According to Interfax, 71% of Moscow residents supported the actions of Russian Security Council Secretary Alexander Lebed in Chechnya in a poll conducted by VTsIOM among 1,305 Moscow residents over the weekend of September 14-15. Only 13% of Moscow residents categorically opposed Lebed's moves in Chechnya. Those supporting Lebed were mainly managers, businessmen and high-skilled specialists. Those opposing Lebed's Chechen efforts mostly included military servicemen and policemen over 40 years old.

96/09/19: On September 19, Boris Yeltsin appointed Emil Pain as his presidential adviser on Chechnya. Pain was previously Deputy Director of inter-ethnic relations and CIS problems at the Presidential Analytical Center. Prior to his appointment to Yeltsin administration, Pain was Director of the Center for Ethnopolitical and Inter-Ethnic Research. Pain also worked in the State Commission for Chechen Settlement, which was disbanded after the appointment of Russian Security Council Secretary Alexander Lebed as Yeltsin's envoy to Chechnya.

96/09/21: Another conference on Chechnya, ordered by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, was held in Moscow to focus on "urgent measures to stabilize the situation in Chechnya." According to Interfax on September 21, a planned visit to Moscow by Acting Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev could also have been on the agenda.

96/09/23: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe hearings on Chechnya, scheduled for September 23, were postponed after both Alexander Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov decided not to attend the proceedings. Both had been invited to Strasbourg two weeks previously. Lebed reportedly did not attend because he believed that doing so would give legitimacy to Chechnya's claims of independence (OMRI, 9/23/96).

96/09/23: The Russian Interior Ministry reported on the casualties suffered during the conflict in Chechnya. The Ministry spokesman informed Interfax that 921 servicemen had been killed, 4,500 troops wounded, 279 were missing, and 50 were in captivity. According to the Ministry, the conflict also had claimed the lives of 280 policemen, with 2,013 wounded, 7 missing and 1 held hostage.

96/09/24: According to a poll conducted among 1,600 Russian residents by the All Russian Center for Public Opinion Research and reported by Interfax , 46% of respondents said that those responsible for military actions in Chechnya should be made accountable for their actions, and 39% stated that all existing agreements on ending combat actions in Chechnya should be honored. As many as 32% of respondents also said that the choice made by the Chechen people regarding their future after the war was over would have to be accepted. On the other hand, 14% deemed it necessary to restore Russian military control over Chechnya and 11% were against recognizing the Chechen separatists' independence bid. A total of 16% of respondents believed that the Chechen problem was Russia's internal affair and that foreign intervention should be avoided. 45% of those polled also believed that the Khasavyurt agreements would result in stable peace in Chechnya.

96/09/26: On September 26 Izvestiya published an interview with Alexander Lebed, in which he asserted that the Chechens would likely decide to remain with Russia, given the good work of Russian Nationalities Ministry, Justice Ministry, Economics Ministry and Ministry of Finance. "I am confident their choice will be sensible. We will have to do a momentous job to convince them, but there is no other way out," said Lebed. According to Lebed, the formation of the Chechen coalition government to both finance and hold the elections under the supervision of observers, was an important part of the peace process.

96/09/27: On September 27, a conference of Russia's North Caucasus republics and regions opened in Nazran, Ingushetia. The conference was attended by Security Council Secretary Alexander Lebed, Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov, and several regional presidents and governors. Chechen leaders Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and Aslan Maskhadov did not attend, while the head of the Moscow-backed Chechen government, Doku Zavgaev, was not invited. The conference participants expressed unanimous support for the Khasavyurt and Novie Atagi agreements. They also approved a special appeal to the Federation Council and the State Duma supporting Lebed's initiatives aimed at a settlement in Chechnya, and discussed the creation of regional security machinery for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the North Caucasus. Ingush President Ruslan Aushev expressed the concern that territorial disputes were likely to arise not only if Chechnya seceded from Russia, but even if Chechnya opted to remain within the Russian Federation. Indeed, as Monitor pointed out on September 30, Chechnya's borders had never been formally determined. In the Soviet period, for example, they had been repeatedly re-drawn, especially after Stalin's deportation of the Chechens and the Ingush in 1944, and again after their return in the mid-1950s (Monitor 9/30/96.)

96/09/30: Russian presidential adviser Emil Pain indicated during a news conference in Moscow that he considered the present situation in Chechnya to be an interim truce, which "may be long lasting but not endless and will lead either to peace or a renewal of combat actions" (Interfax, 9/30/96). In Pain's opinion, the Moscow accord of May 27 and the Nazran accord of June 10 were "far more reasonable and beneficial for Russia." The Nazran accords, according to Pain, were more "symmetric" for Moscow because they envisaged Russian troop withdrawal from Chechnya and the republic's demilitarization at the same time. Pain stated that the only way to move on from the present situation would be to "pass over from the discussion of military matters to the consideration of political and economic problems," and to sign a treaty on an interim status for Chechnya, on interim authorities, and on free democratic elections in the near future.

• Chechnya in Brief Part 1
• Chechnya in Brief Part 2
• Chechnya in Brief Part 4